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2.1    Introduction
The composition of the Canadian labor force has changed dramatically 
over the past few generations. One of the most important changes has been 
in the age composition. This change has been driven partially by demograph-
ics as the baby boom generation pushed its way through youth and middle-
  age; and now approaches traditional retirement ages. However, in addition 
to demographic thrusts there have also been behavioral changes as Canadi-
ans react both to macroeconomic and ﬁ  scal incentives to work. Seeing these 
large composition changes, the potential impact of labor market trends in 
one age segment on other age segments becomes an important question.
On the production side of the economy, younger and older workers can in 
theory be either substitutes or complements. For example, if there are impor-
tant gains from sharing knowledge, training, or combining experience levels 
to produce output, then older and younger workers may be complements. 
On the other hand, if there is little substantive diﬀerence between workers 
of diﬀerent ages, then older and younger workers may be substitutes. It is 
important to keep in mind, however, that a large change in the supply of 
older workers can also have an impact on the demand for output, meaning 
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that the number of jobs in the economy will change as well, not just the 
identity of who ﬁ  lls them.
In previous work, we have investigated the strength of the ﬁ  scal incen-
tives to retire (Gruber 1999), estimated their impact on retirement decisions 
(Baker, Gruber, and Milligan 2004), and simulated the impact of reforms 
on elderly labor force behavior (Baker, Gruber, and Milligan 2007). In 
this chapter, we build on this existing work by examining the impact of 
the previously-  studied long-  run trends in elderly labor market behavior on 
younger workers.
We begin by providing a history of public pensions in Canada, viewed in 
the context of the political pressures coming from both older and younger 
workers. We then present some time series graphs of labor market behavior 
from the 1970s to the 2000s by age group and sex, looking for evidence of 
substitution between older and younger workers. Finally, we present some 
regression results to check how well the inferences from the graphs hold up 
to a more rigorous analysis.
2.2      History of Public Pension Reforms in Canada
The development of public pensions in Canada can be divided into ﬁ  ve 
distinct eras, each with its own social concerns, policy debates, and policy 
actions. In this section we review each of these eras in order to provide 
historical context for the debate about the relationship between older and 
younger workers. Our historical research consisted of reviewing articles pub-
lished in The Globe and Mail from 1950 to the present. We do not focus here 
on the parametric details of the diﬀerent reforms and pensions, but instead 
on the politics surrounding each reform.
2.2.1      1940s/1950s: Introduction of the Old Age Security (OAS)
Before the Second World War, the Royal Commission on Dominion-
  Provincial Relations (commonly called the Rowell-  Sirois Commission) laid 
the groundwork for major changes to the Canadian federation in response to 
the economic crises of the Great Depression. Included in the recommenda-
tions of the Commission were several proposals to enhance the ability of the 
federal government to provide national social insurance, such as unemploy-
ment insurance and pensions, which had been provided provincially until 
that point. After the war, progress on some of the recommendations was 
made by the Liberal (centrist) government of Louis St. Laurent with the 
introduction of a family allowance, a national health insurance program, 
and public pensions. These were meant to create a “comprehensive social 
security program” that was “based on increasing acceptance of the prin-
ciples of social justice” (Globe and Mail, October 26, 1951). The concern 
that generated the policy moves, therefore, was one of social justice and a 
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The public pension component of the post-  war policy development was 
called the Old Age Security (OAS) pension. This pension was a universal 
demogrant paid to those age seventy and over and was funded on a pay-  as-
  you-  go basis from dedicated taxes. The predominant issues in the debate 
were the nature of funding and the base for taxation. No fewer than six 
editorials in the Globe and Mail between 1950 and 1953 criticized the OAS 
system for its lack of prefunding and the nonrelationship at an individual 
level between taxes paid and beneﬁ  ts received. Notable for its absence was 
any discussion of the impact of pensions on labor market behavior.
2.2.2      1960s: Introduction of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
In the 1960s, continued concern about the well-  being of the elderly led to 
pressure for an expansion of the public pension system. The Liberals, now 
led by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, argued that 70 percent of Canadi-
ans were not covered by workplace pensions and that an employment- based 
public pension plan could improve the incomes of the elderly. The opposi-
tion Conservatives preferred to enhance the existing OAS system with an 
addition of ten dollars per month. Extra-  parliamentary opposition came 
from the insurance industry, which argued that private pensions were a prime 
source of investment capital that would disappear with the introduction of 
a public plan. There was also some debate about prefunding the pension, 
which was one of the primary issues leading to Quebec’s decision to form its 
own plan so that Quebec could pursue its social investing goals. In the end, 
the Canada Pension Plan became law and began collecting contributions 
in 1966 and paying beneﬁ  ts in 1967 as a pay-  as-  you-  go plan. The Quebec 
Pension Plan (QPP) was introduced at the same time and was in many ways 
similar to the CPP.
While labor market concerns were not pivotal in the discussion, one argu-
ment raised during the debates was the beneﬁ  t of a portable public pension 
to workers, in contrast to employment-  based pensions that tended to tie an 
employee to an employer.
2.2.3      1980s: Early Retirement in the CPP/QPP
The next era of pension reform arrived in the early 1980s. Two social 
concerns led to pressure for reform. First, high unemployment—especially 
among the youth—led to demands that older workers be forced out of the 
labor force to “make room” for younger workers. There was also a desire to 
allow the elderly more time in retirement; more leisure and less work.
In 1984, the Parti Quebecois (social democratic) government in Quebec 
introduced an early retirement option to the Quebec Pension Plan that 
allowed for actuarially-  adjusted retirement with beneﬁ  ts as early as age 
sixty. According to the Globe and Mail on December 20, 1986, the intent of 
the change was to lower unemployment. A federal election in 1984 delayed 
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Conservative government had implemented a similar early retirement pack-
age in the rest of the country for the CPP.
In contrast to the earlier eras, the early retirement reform in 1984 to 1987 
was directly motivated by concerns emanating from the labor market. This 
was the stated motivation of the government and also appeared in argu-
ments by organizations outside government.
2.2.4      1990s: Reforming the CPP
The next era of change in public pensions in Canada focused on the Can-
ada Pension Plan in the mid- 1990s. The motivation for reform was the long-
 term  ﬁ   nancial  health  of  the  program.  Projections  from  the  Chief  Actuary 
suggested that contribution rates would have to rise dramatically if promised 
beneﬁ  ts were to be paid.
Several possibilities for reform were contemplated. Higher payroll taxes 
were discussed both as aﬀecting intergenerational burdens and as aﬀecting 
labor markets. There was a fear that higher payroll taxes would increase 
unemployment. In addition, proposals to increase the retirement age were 
met with the charge that this would “clog up job opportunities” (Globe and 
Mail, June 5, 1996).
2.2.5      2000s: Labor Market Shortages
The ﬁ  nal era to be considered is the boom period starting in the middle 
part of the 2000s decade. With Canadian unemployment rates reaching gen-
erational lows, discussion shifted from unemployment to worker shortages 
in many industries. The policy actions under consideration were changes 
to public pensions to encourage more work (see Milligan 2005) and also 
changes to mandatory retirement regulations. Several provinces changed 
their labor laws to make them less amenable to mandatory retirement in 
union contracts. An interesting feature of this debate has been the lack 
of vigor among those supporting mandatory retirement. Because of labor 
market tightness, there has been little concern about the impact of these 
changes on the work opportunities of the young.
2.2.6    Summary
To conclude, the importance of labor market considerations in the public 
debate about public pensions has varied tremendously through time. In the 
ﬁ  rst post-  war reforms, the welfare of the elderly was of utmost concern. 
However, as unemployment became a dominant social issue in the early 
1980s, the impact of elderly work on younger workers gained in political 
importance. Reforms in the 1990s that aimed to restore long-  run ﬁ  nan-
cial stability to public pensions were evaluated in part by considering their 
impact on labor markets. Finally, the labor market boom of the 2000s has 
seemingly removed concerns about the impact of elderly work on the young 
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Figure 2.1 shows the development of elderly labor force participation over 
the 1976 to 2006 time period for males and females pooled together. There 
is a line drawn in 1987 when the early retirement provisions of the CPP 
were introduced. Elderly in this graph is deﬁ  ned as the age range ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve 
to sixty-  four. (We explain the data source in detail in the next section.) Also 
on the graph is the labor force participation (LFP) rate for the young and 
the unemployment rate for the young, where young is deﬁ  ned as ages twenty 
to twenty-  four. Elderly labor force participation moves quite smoothly and 
slowly down from 1976 to 1996, dropping from 42.9 percent down to 36.3 
percent. After 1996, elderly LFP increases over the next ten years up to 
48.5 percent. This phenomenon is studied in Schirle (2008), who ﬁ  nds that 
a substantial source of the trend is joint retirement—married males are 
increasingly likely to have a still-  working wife, and do not want to retire 
alone. The unemployment rate and LFP rate for the young show more signs 
of cyclicality than evident for the elderly. However, in the late 1990s as elderly 
LFP rose, the LFP of the young appears to have risen as well, providing 
some preliminary evidence against a “crowd out” eﬀect of elderly LFP on 
the labor market behavior of the young.
Looking at males and females separately in ﬁ  gures 2.2 and 2.3, subtle 
diﬀerences emerge. First, elderly LFP for males declines by about 15 per-
centage points from 1976 to 1996, before rebounding over the last decade. 
Fig. 2.1    Evolution of elderly labor force participation for elderly and the young, 
both sexesFig. 2.2    Evolution of elderly labor force participation for elderly and the 
young, males
Fig. 2.3    Evolution of elderly labor force participation for elderly and the 
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In contrast, elderly female LFP grows gently until the mid-  1990s, and more 
sharply thereafter. For the young, the lines for males show higher cyclical-
ity. Unemployment rates (in particular for males) rise more sharply in the 
recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s, whereas female unemployment 
changes are more muted. As with the pooled sex graphs, however, there is 
little evidence here that the labor supply changes of the elderly are having 
impact on the young.
2.3    Time  Trends
To examine the impact of the labor market behavior of the old on the 
work of the young, we now turn to the data. The best data source available to 
us is the monthly Labor Force Survey (LFS) conducted by Statistics Canada. 
The Labor Force Survey is a monthly survey into which a nationally repre-
sentative sample is chosen. Households stay in the survey for six months. 
The microdata are available from January 1976 to 2006. Sample sizes are 
typically about 50,000 per month. This survey gives us the best combination 
of long time frame, detailed and consistent questions, and large sample. 
Alternatives such as the Survey of Consumer Finances or the Census do not 
give annual coverage and are not available much earlier than the LFS.
The ﬁ  rst step in preparing our analysis is to divide the LFS sample into age 
groups. We do this by designating individuals age twenty to twenty-  four as 
“young,” twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four as “prime age” and ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four 
as “elderly.” We then form variables indicating the labor market activity of 
each individual, with variables for labor force participation, employment, 
unemployment, and in school. To form the annual time series that we use 
for this analysis we simply pool together the twelve months within each 
calendar year.
We plot both sexes pooled together, followed by separate graphs for males 
and females in each case. Because the substitution between older and younger 
workers could happen between males and females, the overall pooled graphs 
are most relevant for the study of elderly-  young labor market interactions. 
However, the pooled graphs obscure some of the long-  run trends aﬀecting 
each sex, so we also provide separate graphs by sex.
The time series graph shown in ﬁ  gure 2.4 plots the labor force participa-
tion (LFP) of the elderly against unemployment rates for the young and 
prime age groups. The motivation for this graph is to see whether movements 
in elderly LFP have translated into impacts on the work opportunities of the 
rest of the labor market. The overwhelming impression of elderly LFP over 
the ﬁ  rst twenty years of the sample is its ﬂ  atness up to 1996. Over this time 
period, the ebbs and ﬂ  ows of the business cycle are evident on the unem-
ployment rates of the young and prime age samples. Over the last ten years 
of the series, the LFP of the elderly increased by more than 10 percentage 
points. However, over this same time period, the unemployment rates of the 84        Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan
young and prime aged dropped. Overall, this ﬁ  rst look at the data gives no 
indication that trends in elderly LFP have any inﬂ  uence on the unemploy-
ment rates of the young and prime aged.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 repeat the same analysis for males and females. As 
with ﬁ  gures 2.1 through 2.3, male elderly employment shows a U-  shaped 
pattern while for females a gentle upward trend becomes steeper in the mid-
  1990s. The milder cyclicality of female youth unemployment compared to 
males carries forward to the prime- age females and males. However, for both 
males and females the prime age unemployment rates show less cyclicality 
than for the youth.
The next set of time series graphs show the LFP of the elderly against 
employment rates for the young and prime aged. This provides a slightly 
diﬀerent view on the matter, since it is possible that elderly LFP does not 
aﬀect unemployment if those displaced by elderly LFP move from employ-
ment to being out of the labor market entirely. Figure 2.7 shows both sexes 
together. Elderly LFP is repeated in ﬁ  gure 2.7 the same as was seen in ﬁ  gure 
2.4. Employment rates for the young show strong business cycle eﬀects, with 
drops in 1982 and in the early 1990s. Employment of the prime aged shows 
a similar pattern, but with muted amplitudes relative to the young. Again, 
in the post-  1996 era the labor market of all three age groups is improving, 
with no sign of any crowding out of the employment of the young and prime 
aged from the increasing LFP of the elderly. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 repeat the 
Fig. 2.4    Elderly labor force participation versus unemployment for the young and 
prime age, both sexesFig. 2.5    Elderly labor force participation versus unemployment for the young and 
prime age, males
Fig. 2.6    Elderly labor force participation versus unemployment for the young and 
prime age, femalesFig. 2.7    Elderly labor force participation versus employment for the young and 
prime age, both sexes
Fig. 2.8    Elderly labor force participation versus employment for the young and 
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exercise for males and females separately. The previously noted trends are 
present here as well, with more cyclicality present for younger and male lines. 
The most striking trend is the sharp, consistent upward march of prime aged 
female employment over this time period. Overall, there does not appear to 
be much visual evidence of any crowding out of the employment of younger 
workers by the elderly.
2.4    Regression  Results
In the next stage of our analysis, we turn to regression evidence to see if 
the inferences drawn from the graphs stand up to more rigorous tests. We 
estimate time series regressions of the form:
Yt    0    1 ELDERLYEMPt   Xt 2   et.
The dependent variable Yt is a measure of labor force participation, 
 ELDERLYEMPt is the employment rate for the elderly age group, Xt is a 
vector of national-  level control variables, and et is the usual error term. We 
use several diﬀerent dependent variables, including the rate of unemploy-
ment, employment, and school attendance for the young, and unemploy-
ment and employment for the prime aged. The key independent variable in 
each regression is the rate of elderly employment. We try speciﬁ  cations with 
Fig. 2.9    Elderly labor force participation versus employment for the young and 
prime age, females88        Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan
and without additional control variables. The additional control variables 
include the percent share of gross domestic product (GDP) in manufactur-
ing, the level of GDP per capita, and the growth rate of GDP per capita.
We also try some transformations of the data. First, we try lagging the 
elderly employment variable by three years to see if there might be a delay 
in the timing of the response to changes in elderly employment. Second, we 
diﬀerence the data across ﬁ  ve years in order to look at changes rather than 
levels. We chose ﬁ  ve years in order to try to diﬀerence out ﬂ  uctuations in the 
business cycle. Finally, we tried a ﬁ  ve year diﬀerence of the log of elderly 
employment and the log of the dependent variables.
2.4.1    Direct  Eﬀect of Elderly Employment on 
Young and Prime-  Age Outcomes
We ﬁ rst look for a direct eﬀect of the employment of the elderly on 
younger labor market participants. The results appear in table 2.1. The 
result shown in the upper left cell reports that a one point increase in elderly 
employment predicts a –0.334 point drop in the unemployment rate for the 
young. This result is in the opposite direction of what would be expected if 
increased elderly employment cost younger participants work opportuni-
ties. The results for employment in the second column are consistent with 
the ﬁ  rst column. Prime age results are also similar. These results in the top 
panel of the table, however, are from a speciﬁ  cation without any control 
variables. In the bottom panel of the table we show that the coeﬃcients are 
slightly attenuated when we control for manufacturing share, GDP, and 
GDP growth.
In the second row of the table, we use a three-  year lag of elderly employ-
ment. The impact on young unemployment is now slightly positive, but not 
even close to statistically signiﬁ  cant. The youth employment eﬀect is still 
positive, however. Neither of the eﬀects on prime aged behavior is statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant.
In the third and fourth rows of the table, we investigate diﬀerenced speci-
ﬁ  cations. Using both the ﬁ  fth diﬀerence and the ﬁ  fth log diﬀerence, the 
inferences remain unchanged. There is no evidence of crowding out of labor 
market activity of the young when the elderly increase their labor force 
participation.
The bottom panel of table 2.1 repeats the same set of analyses, but includes 
several controls variables for GDP, GDP growth, and share of manufactur-
ing in GDP. With the control variables included, the signs on almost all of 
the estimates are unchanged, but the magnitudes and statistical signiﬁ  cance 
becomes more muted. This suggests that the results in the top half of the 
panel were driven in part by strong economic growth—in a strong growth 
environment both young and elderly employment improves.
Focusing on the prime aged results, some confusion arises. Elderly employ-
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ment of prime aged men and women. This is not impossible, however, since 
employment and unemployment rates do not need to sum to one. Instead, 
being out of the labor force must rise. This provides some suggestive evi-
dence of a degree of crowding out between elderly and prime aged individu-
als. We investigate this further following in our men-  only sample.
We repeat the analysis in table 2.2, but for males only. Through this time 
period, the graphical analysis tells us that there is more variation in unem-
ployment and employment among males, and that male employment is 
higher. For this reason, we seek to ﬁ  nd out if an analysis focused on males 
only reveals diﬀerent results. The impact of elderly male employment rates 
on youth male unemployment rates is more muted than for the pooled sexes 
results, but still the signs are mostly negative. Similarly, the positive eﬀect on 
youth employment persists in the male sample.
The prime aged results seen in the pooled men and women sample are 
strongly overturned here in the men- only sample. Again, the unemployment 
rate responds negatively to more elderly employment. However, in contrast 
to the pooled analysis, here with males only we ﬁ  nd a positive response of 
prime aged employment to increasing elderly employment. This suggests 
that the negative relationship uncovered in table 2.1 might be driven by the 
Table 2.1  Direct regressions of labor market crowd-  out: Both sexes
Youth Prime age
    UE   EMP   SCH   UE   EMP
No controls
Levels –0.334 0.413 –0.048 –0.287 0.251
(0.082) (0.107) (0.157) (0.048) (0.188)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
0.031 0.371 –0.571 –0.125 –0.288
(0.146) (0.175) (0.178) (0.090) (0.225)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.347 0.638 –0.275 –0.299 0.220
(0.136) (0.175) (0.061) (0.081) (0.117)
5-  year log diﬀerence –1.790 0.458 –1.274 –2.445 0.139
(0.604) (0.120) (0.238) (0.594) (0.075)
With controls
Levels –0.224 0.407 –0.349 –0.276 –0.136
(0.060) (0.103) (0.068) (0.032) (0.049)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
–0.149 0.558 –0.539 –0.246 –0.132
(0.081) (0.141) (0.076) (0.050) (0.061)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.187 –0.078 0.001 –0.246 –0.318
(0.136) (0.131) (0.069) (0.072) (0.081)
5-  year log diﬀerence
 
–1.034 0.039 –0.427 –2.355 –0.117
  (0.605)   (0.069)   (0.301)   (0.585)   (0.046)
Notes: Reported in each cell is the coeﬃcient on elderly employment in separate regressions 
with the dependent variable listed in the column headings. The standard error is beneath each 
estimate in parentheses. The diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations appear in each row of the table. The spec-
iﬁ  cations are explained in the main text.90        Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan
secular and strong upward trend in female labor force participation seen in 
ﬁ  gure 2.9.
The largest impression from the evidence in table 2.1 and table 2.2 is the 
absence of any consistent indication that the labor market behavior of 
the elderly had a negative impact on the employment of the young. For the 
prime aged there was some evidence in favor of crowd-  out in the pooled 
sample, but this was reversed in the men-  only sample. What’s more, if any-
thing, the evidence suggests that employment of the diﬀerent age groups 
tends to move together rather than in opposite directions.
2.4.2    Eﬀect of Retirement Incentives on Employment Patterns
A concern with the evidence presented in tables 2.1 and 2.2 is that both 
elderly employment and young employment are driven by common but 
unmeasured factors. To try to improve the inferences on the causal nature 
of the relationship, we turn to an approach that exploits changes in policy 
through time. We develop an annual index of the incentives for elderly work-
ers to retire, based on the parameters of Canada’s public pension system. 
When the incentive index is larger, there is a greater incentive to exit the 
Table 2.2  Direct regressions of labor market crowd-  out: Males only
Youth Prime age
    UE   EMP   SCH   UE   EMP
No controls
Levels –0.070 0.465 –0.325 –0.152 0.352
(0.075) (0.071) (0.044) (0.042) (0.038)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
0.145 0.253 –0.354 0.010 0.178
(0.074) (0.096) (0.027) (0.049) (0.058)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.349 0.651 –0.223 –0.308 0.451
(0.148) (0.176) (0.051) (0.084) (0.097)
5-  year log diﬀerence –1.791 0.553 –1.246 –2.677 0.318
(0.706) (0.148) (0.245) (0.715) (0.069)
With controls
Levels –0.139 0.435 –0.241 –0.190 0.335
(0.051) (0.067) (0.037) (0.026) (0.032)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
–0.103 0.478 –0.316 –0.170 0.347
(0.063) (0.087) (0.033) (0.037) (0.047)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.106 0.135 –0.021 –0.169 0.180
(0.141) (0.140) (0.052) (0.074) (0.077)
5-  year log diﬀerence
 
 –0.591 0.151 –0.469 –2.010 0.183
(0.766)   (0.125)   (0.263)   (0.809)   (0.061)
Notes: Reported in each cell is the coeﬃcient on elderly employment in separate regressions 
with the dependent variable listed in the column headings. The standard error is beneath each 
estimate in parentheses. The diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations appear in each row of the table. The spec-
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labor market. We provide further detail on the construction of this index 
in the appendix.
We graph the incentive measures in ﬁ  gure 2.10. There are two indexes we 
use: Wbar and Ibar. Both are described in detail in the appendix. The Wbar 
represents the average Income Security Wealth among labor market partici-
pants. The Wbar includes both Income Security Wealth and a dynamic incen-
tive measure called “peak value” that captures the pension accrual from con-
tinued work. For the case of Canada, the diﬀerence between current and peak 
wealth is typically quite ﬂ  at, so there is little diﬀerence between Ibar and Wbar. 
Both of these incentive measures show strong, consistent growth until the mid-
 1990s when they level out. The ﬁ  gure also graphs the employment rate among 
the elderly. It is only available from 1976 when the LFS data start. Elderly 
employment declines through the mid-  1990s when it begins to rebound.
This graph suggests there may be a relationship between incentives and 
employment of the elderly. However, given that we have only two time series 
to conduct the inference, it is far from certain that the relationship observed 
is causal. Other factors could be inﬂ  uencing each of these trends.
Another view on this relationship is provided in ﬁ  gure 2.11, which plots 
the ﬁ  fth diﬀerence of the Ibar measure and elderly employment. There 
appears to be a tight negative relationship between them. However, upon 
closer inspection, the serial pattern of the data points cautions us to consider 
that this relationship may be spurious.
Fig. 2.10    Elderly employment rate, I (y) and W (y)92        Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan
The regression results are displayed in table 2.3 for both sexes pooled 
together. To begin, we look at the results for the elderly. These results are in 
some sense the “ﬁ  rst stage,” as we expect the incentives to have an impact 
on the work behavior of the elderly as a precursor to their impact on the 
younger workers. The results without control variables in the top half of 
table 2.3 are mixed. However, when the control variables are included in the 
bottom half of the table, the results become more consistent. As the policy 
incentives to retire increase, the employment of the elderly decreases. There 
is also a small increase in the measured unemployment rate of the elderly. 
These results hold across all four speciﬁ  cations in the table.
When looking at the results for the young and the prime aged, the speci-
ﬁ  cation can be thought of as a “reduced form” estimate. That is, we are 
estimating the eﬀect of a higher incentive for the elderly to retire on the work 
behavior of the young and middle aged. The presumed path through which 
the changes in incentives aﬀect the younger workers is through their impact 
on the labor market behavior of the elderly. For the young, the results for 
employment are in some places small and insigniﬁ  cant but are almost all 
negative. This suggests that, if anything, a decrease in elderly employment 
is associated with a decrease in young employment. This does not support 
the crowd- out story. The results for the prime aged individuals, however, are 
more mixed. The positive coeﬃcients on employment suggest that greater 
incentives for the elderly to retire are associated with more work by middle-
 aged workers, which is consistent with the idea that induced retirement of the 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.94        Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan
elderly creates more employment for the middle aged. However, the unem-
ployment results for the prime aged are also positive, which is contradictory 
to the employment results. This leads us again to look at males only.
In table 2.4 we explore the results in the subsample of males. To begin, the 
“ﬁ  rst-  stage” eﬀect of the incentive measure on elderly employment is very 
strong here. For example, in the levels regression with controls, the coeﬃcient 
in table 2.4 is –0.443, versus –0.285 with both sexes pooled in table 2.3. The 
estimates for youth unemployment and employment are for the most part 
consistent in both magnitude and sign with the estimates from table 2.3. 
For the prime aged males, however, we now ﬁ  nd a negative relationship for 
employment. That is, we no longer have evidence of crowd-  out. As with the 
previous analysis in tables 2.1 and 2.2, this diﬀerence may be driven by a 
secular upward trend in female employment as seen in ﬁ  gure 2.9.
In sum, the results using the incentive to retire index suggest that the 
incentives may have an impact on the elderly, but it is not clear if it is causal. 
The changes in elderly employment have a mixed and mostly small impact on 
the working behavior of the young and prime aged. There is some evidence 
in favor of a positive relationship between elderly and the employment of 
younger individuals, but no consistent evidence of any crowding out.
2.5    Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the relationship between the work of 
the elderly and the work of Canadians in other age groups. Historically, 
the political concern about the impact of elderly employment on younger 
workers seems to be strongly related to the business cycle and especially the 
unemployment rates of younger workers. In the graphs, we ﬁ  nd little visual 
evidence that trends in elderly labor force participation have had an impact 
on the labor markets of the younger. Finally, our regression evidence has 
shown that—if anything—the employment of the young and prime aged 
tends to move in the same direction as the elderly.
Several important caveats limit the conclusions that may be drawn from 
our results. First, the movements in elderly labor force participation over the 
1976 to 2006 period have not been sharp, so there simply may not be enough 
variation to identify any eﬀects on other labor markets. Second, the results 
we ﬁ  nd here for Canada may not hold in other countries with diﬀerent labor 
market institutions, practices, and histories. Finally, the time series regres-
sions we run are in some ways quite crude and rely on very few observations 
to describe the behavior of millions of workers. With these caveats in mind, 
however, it is possible for us to conclude that we ﬁ  nd no strong evidence of 
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Appendix
Calculating the Incentive Measure
The goal of the exercise is to arrive at a single incentive number for each 
calendar year to be used in the time series regressions. We begin with a single 
birth cohort born in 1920 and build a lifetime earnings proﬁ  le for them. 
Data are drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finances for available years 
and then extrapolated forward and backward using indexes of wage growth. 
This earnings proﬁ  le is then shifted for inﬂ  ation forward and backward to 
generate equivalent real wage proﬁ  les for all birth cohorts. We repeat this 
exercise for each decile of the earnings distribution, separately for males and 
females. This method ensures that the only diﬀerence in incentive measures 
across years will be in changes in beneﬁ  t formulas and not cross-  cohort 
diﬀerences in wages.
These cohort age-  earnings proﬁ  les are next pushed through our Cana-
dian income security beneﬁ  ts calculator developed in Baker, Gruber, and 
Milligan (2004, 2007). At each age from ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  nine, we calculate 
the capitalized value of future beneﬁ  ts (Income Security Wealth or ISW) 
and also the “peak value” concept found in Baker, Gruber, and Milligan 
(2004). The peak value represents the diﬀerence between current ISW and its 
highest value in the future, given current information for a forward- looking 
individual.
To collapse this down to an annual time series, we start by recognizing that 
an individual viewed at age a has faced retirement incentives at age a, a – 1, 
a – 2, . . . back to the ﬁ  rst age of eligibility. We therefore average the incen-
tives within a cohort across ages (from the current age back to age ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve), 
using the aggregate age- year- sex- speciﬁ  c labor force participation as weights. 
We generate the age-  year-  sex labor force participation rates from the Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances. Since this survey only goes back to 1971 and is 
also missing some years, we ﬁ  ll in missing years and extrapolate backwards 
using an assumption of constant age- sex labor force participation rates. This 
calculation gives us an average exposure to retirement incentives for each 
cohort in each year of interest.
The ﬁ  nal step involves collapsing the average incentive measures to a single 
number for each year. This means we must average the incentive measures 
faced by each cohort in a given year. To do this, we weight by the proportion 
of the population represented by each age in a given year.
To enrich the measurement of incentives, we assign a weight to the ISW 
component and the peak value component. We determined these weights 
using an iterative technique, ﬁ  nding weights that maximized the ﬁ  t of a 
regression of elderly LFP on the incentive measure.
The foregoing can be expressed mathematically as follows. The incentive 
measure I at age a and year y can be expressed as:The Interaction of Youth and Elderly Labor Markets in Canada    9 7
I(a, y)   { W(a, y)    [W(a, y)   PV   (a, y)]},
where W(a,y) is the ISW at age a and year y, PV   (a,y) is the peak value of 
ISW, and   and   are the weighting parameters for the wealth level and peak 
value diﬀerence, respectively. These I(a,y) terms are then summed across all 
previous ages, within cohort:
I (a, y)   
   
P(a,y)×
I(a,y)× LFP(a −t,y −t −1)
t=0
a−55 ∑

































where LFP(a – t, y – t – 1) is the labor force participation rate for a member 
of the cohort in a previous year. The extra minus one accounts for the fact 
that we want the labor force participation rate at the beginning of the year, 
not during the year. Finally, we average across all cohorts in a particular 
year, where P(a,y) is the population of the cohort in a given year. This I (y) 
term is the incentives index used for the regressions appearing in tables 2.3 
and 2.4.
We also make use of W (y), which is calculated by substituting the ISW 
of the individual at age a and year y, W(a,y), in for I(a,y). This W (y) term 
calculates the average pension wealth across individuals in a given year.
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